SRAM memory offers very good security protection, as the information from it can be easily erased by disconnecting the power supply if the alarm is triggered. Performing invasive or semi-invasive IC Crack is very problematic because any attempt to read mcu source code su***ce would very likely destroy the data.
For example, decapsulation requires very strong acids to be used which are conductive and cannot be used on a powered up chip. Even if the MCU Crack manages to access the die, the state of its transistors cannot be observed optically. Microprobing is difficult because the internal wires are buried under top metal bit-lines, ground and power supply wires.
The only practical way to access the memory is from the rear side of the chip die, but this requires more expensive equipment and a highly skilled IC Attacker. Meantime, there are some semi-invasive techniques that allow observation of the memory state, but require special laser scanning microscopes. At the same time non-invasive IC Cracks can be used to exploit any problems that might exist in the memory inte***ce, as happened with the Dallas Semiconductor secure microcontrolle. Data remanence could cause some problems to SRAM security as well. At temperatures below 0˚C some samples of the SRAM chips retain information for hours. But, in general, SRAM memory offers a very good level of protection and low-temperature attacks can be avoided by placing temperature sensors into the secure module enclosure as in the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor.
Please contact techip688@gmail.com or skype:techip.mcu.01
For example, decapsulation requires very strong acids to be used which are conductive and cannot be used on a powered up chip. Even if the MCU Crack manages to access the die, the state of its transistors cannot be observed optically. Microprobing is difficult because the internal wires are buried under top metal bit-lines, ground and power supply wires.
The only practical way to access the memory is from the rear side of the chip die, but this requires more expensive equipment and a highly skilled IC Attacker. Meantime, there are some semi-invasive techniques that allow observation of the memory state, but require special laser scanning microscopes. At the same time non-invasive IC Cracks can be used to exploit any problems that might exist in the memory inte***ce, as happened with the Dallas Semiconductor secure microcontrolle. Data remanence could cause some problems to SRAM security as well. At temperatures below 0˚C some samples of the SRAM chips retain information for hours. But, in general, SRAM memory offers a very good level of protection and low-temperature attacks can be avoided by placing temperature sensors into the secure module enclosure as in the IBM 4758 cryptoprocessor.
Please contact techip688@gmail.com or skype:techip.mcu.01